- Lack of unified and independent regulatory controls. "Perhaps the biggest takeaway from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station disaster concerns the nonexistence of an effective nuclear regulatory organization in Japan—one that is independent from nuclear enterprises, politics, or academia; in short, independent from any community within the 'nuclear power village.' To work towards this objective post-Fukushima, the Japanese government established the Nuclear Regulation Authority—an independent outﬁt headed by Chairman Shunichi Tanaka, former president of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan and former director of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (previously known as the Tokai Research and Development Center of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute)—as well as the Nuclear Regulation Agency as its secretariat, and the two regulatory outﬁts debuted in September 2012. Since then, however, the Nuclear Regulation Authority has been caught in constant crossﬁre between pro and anti-nuclear groups. And the pressure has not been mild … a national consensus remained unreached on both the nation's regulation of nuclear power stations and its nuclear energy policy issues."
- Faulty management oversight. "In March 2013, TEPCO's Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee published a report in which it admitted—for the ﬁrst time—that the accident was a 'human-generated disaster.' This is, in fact, made obvious in the following pages, as our commission illuminates the clear lack of facilitation and preparedness for a severe incident at a nuclear power station in Japan. Yet the lessons to be learned from Fukushima are not only safety issues, but security issues as well. That said, it remains to be seen whether TEPCO as well as NRA will work to deepen security at its plants."
- False sense of infallible technology. "The myth of absolute safety blocked implementation of the so-called 'backfit approach,' in which new scientific knowledge and the latest technological developments are incorporated into existing nuclear power generation systems in order to improve security. In the case of Fukushima, Japan's power companies and regulatory bodies feared that any safety improvements would provoke criticism that the existing safety provisions and regulations were inadequate— and then such criticisms would have to be addressed. In addition, they feared that the public would demand that nuclear reactors be shut down until all such safety improvements had been fully implemented."
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